Abstract-This paper explored the opportunities for using unmanned surface vehicles for anti-submarine warfare. Areas of the problem where such vehicles are likely to contribute value are discussed, along with an approach for developing and utilizing such vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
It seems that no matter where one turns to these days, there is always some news story about a revolutionary autonomous system or product that will make everyone's' collective lives easier. However, to accompany the glowing review of a new product, there also seems to be a harsh critique quick on its heels to remind the public that autonomous systems have a long way to go before they can be trusted to drive cars and fly aircraft or news stories about mishaps involving the new products. No stranger to this environment is the U.S. military, an organization with slightly different goals (other than profits) for unmanned systems.
For the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) the concern is to minimize exposure of soldiers/sailors/airmen/marines to missions that are dull, dirty, or dangerous. Dull missions tax a human's concentration, are subject to fatigue forces, and require prolonged vigilance. This mission area is better served by an entity that does not get tired, frustrated, or bored, that will make 'good' decisions twenty minutes or twenty hours into a sortie. Dirty missions involve exposure to unhealthy environmental conditions, such as fumes, toxic substances, infectious biological materials or radiation. Entities that are not sensitive to such conditions can perform such missions with fewer constraints on exposure time. Mitigating risks to our forces is also a standard defense concern -it does not make sense to send personnel into dangerous areas if a mass produced automated system can do the job as effectively.
One particular mission that makes a good candidate for automated systems is in the clandestine world of antisubmarine warfare (ASW). In 2007, the U.S. Navy identified seven vital mission areas for Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs). The ASW mission was second only to the Mine Countermeasure (MCM) mission in this list [1] . In this report, USVs were recommended to tackle two categories of ASW: Maritime Shield and Protected Passage. These missions are illustrated in Fig. 1 , which has been reproduced from [1] .
Following this report in 2013, the RAND Corporation published recommendations for certain ASW mission-subsets, specifically: unarmed ASW area sanitization and overt cued ASW tracking [2] . These two documents serve as the basis for research into how to apply USVs to ASW. 
II. THE PROBLEM
A submarine is a stealth asset, capable of disappearing beneath the waves to strike out at surface ships, launch long range strikes, conduct infiltration operations, or to conduct espionage. Unlike surface ships, a sub cannot be easily monitored or tracked, and so its intentions are usually unknown. This is what makes a sub such a good deterrent -its ability to strike first without notice. However, this advantage also makes them quite a risk, and a target for prosecution.
According to Part II, Section 3, Article 20 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a submarine that is transiting innocently MUST do so on the surface while showing their flag [3] . This should be interpreted as such: in failing to comply with these requirements, a submarine is purposefully being evasive and is likely conducting operations that the coastal nation would not be very pleased about. This thought can be applied to the open ocean as well.
If a submarine wants to be 'friendly' it will do so on the surface as this nullifies his advantages and shows that he is not (as much) of a threat. Conversely, if a submarine is detected, and does not surface to show good will, then it can be assumed that the submarine may have ulterior motives, and needs to be treated with suspicion. Consider this analogy: While it may be against some jurisdictions laws to wear masks or disguises, it is not fully prohibited. However, when asked to remove said articles by a member of law enforcement, and an individual refuses to comply, then their motives are immediately questioned. Was their intent to be disguised in the commission of a crime, or are they suspected of crimes and were trying to conceal their identity to avoid arrest? This is a fundamental concept in ASW: if a submarine were "playing nice" they would do so on the surface, or would otherwise establish communications. Failure to do so implies that they do not want to be found. This is why searching for submarines is referred to as "hunting" and why there exist processes called "kill chains" -like the criminal referred to above, the situation could turn aggressive quickly, and friendly forces might be required to use deadly force to subdue the would be assailant.
Around the world, there are two major types of submarines in service: the diesel-electric (aka conventional) and the nuclear powered submarine. It should come as no surprise that both types of vessels have advantages and draw backs.
Diesel-electric vessels are generally smaller, have less mission endurance, cannot go as deep or as fast, and don't stray too far out of coastal waters. However, what they lack in size and speed they make up for in silence. When necessary, a conventional submarine can run solely off its battery, which makes them very quiet; similar to the hybrid and electric vehicles. The drawback of course is that the submarine must run its very noisy diesel engine to recharge its battery, and this usually requires a trip to the surface to vent combustion. Such a submarine does not need to fully breach the surface, since the use of a snorkel allows for submerged operation, but the snorkel is detectable by surface and air search platforms. Some types of diesels known as Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) boats can extend their underwater time, but will at some point need to come to snorkel depth.
For nuclear vessels, underway endurance is unparalleled, limited primarily by their ability to support their human crew. Additionally, given the increase in power available, these vessels tend to be larger and can dive to deeper depths. While these ships are more quiet than when a conventional sub is running its diesel engine, they are noisier than that same conventional sub when it is on battery.
When deciding to counter a submarine threat, one must plan for the worst case scenario -the key is deciding which scenario is the worst. In a thought, it largely depends on a list of factors, to include: season, acoustic conditions, maritime traffic density, geographic and political considerations, likely adversary order of battle, and likely adversary weapons and employment tactics. Once USVs were settled upon as a means to augment ASW forces, it needed to be decided what environment was likely to benefit most. For the purposes of this document, carrier battlegroup protection was considered to be the most important area to focus on.
With the general area and concept of operations chosen, it is necessary to identify what the worst cases could be. Without delving too far into the details, a likely worst case could be: A long endurance conventional submarine (likely AIP) that is crewed with proficient and experienced sailors that are familiar with their own territorial waters and that possess a rough idea where the Battlegroup is operating, while the Battlegroup is unaware of the submarine's presence. Alternatively, it would be equally bad for the Battlegroup to be overwhelmed with FALSE positive submarine sightings and would need spend most of its resources on discriminating between what was real and what was a decoy.
III. MARITIME SHIELD At the heart of a Maritime Shield scenario lies the Aircraft Carrier, the mobile airfield and moving piece of sovereign American territory. The aircraft carrier is the most well-known, but it is not the only vessel that may be designated as the High Value Unit or HVU of a Battlegroup. Much like a VIP surrounded by body guards, the HVU has escorts with abilities to help defend it and if necessary allow the HVU to escape destruction by sacrificing themselves. When applied to ASW, maritime shield seeks to push out a defensive boundary around a HVU operating in a local area, and to detect any submerged vessel that may attempt to penetrate a perimeter around the HVU. Like body guards interlocking hands around a celebrity in a crowd, the more guards one can hire, the larger a protective ring can be formed, and therefore the larger sanitized area can be available for the VIP to operate in.
The best defenses have depth to them, meaning that there are multiple layers that an adversary must pass through before they can reach their target. Ideally, an HVU would have multiple rings, composed of many sensors with overlapping detection zones, so that the risk of a threat slipping by undetected is minimized. Practically speaking, cost is a major limiting factor, along with communication channels, bandwidth concerns, and logistic constraints. This means that the shape or composition of defensive forces may be something less than ideal [1] .
IV. PROTECTED PASSAGE Ships don't stay in the same spot of water forever, eventually they need to head to port or proceed to another mission area. When this occurs, the HVU becomes vulnerable to a new set of concerns. Once the fleet starts to move, it becomes susceptible to ambush, traps, and flanking. A submarine that had been dissuaded from penetrating the shield of sensors in the previous situation can just "go down the road" so to speak and lie in wait.
To prevent this, armed platforms will usually go ahead of the HVU and clear a path. This strategy works to a point, but it still has some vulnerabilities. The HVU would be better protected if it not only had a vanguard, but also a rearguard and protection on its flanks. As in the case of maritime shield, to get the ideal coverage becomes prohibitively expensive to field with capital ship assets alone [1] .
V. THE SOLUTION
USVs with selected autonomous capabilities have a role to play in the solution to the maritime shield and protected passage problems, provided that they can be designed to operate reliably and economically.
One consideration for value added is low cost: unmanned vehicles do not need many of the facilities common on manned platforms that are required for human life support, ranging from the obvious ones, such as sleeping, dining and laundry facilities, to factors normally assumed without any thought, such as supplies of fresh water and breathable air. Eliminating such requirements enables simpler and less expensive design options for realizing some needed characteristics.
For example, seaworthiness in high sea states could be achieved in such vehicles by sealing them completely, so that they can be designed to be self-righting and capable of continuing operation even after capsizing. This differs from conventional approaches to seaworthiness such as requiring the hulls to be large compared to expected wave size, which can be very expensive.
A related consideration is affordable numbers of units: low cost implies many more USV platforms could be devoted to ASW than if it was done using only capital ships, and hence more sensors and better sensor coverage could be feasibly deployed, resulting in more effective sub detection.
When one analyses this problem, it becomes clear that a multi-disciplinary approach is required. Hulls to house sensors need to be designed, sensors to go on these hulls need to be designed or procured, and a means to control all of these moving parts is necessary to contain the pandemonium.
Understanding that selecting a sensor, or suite of sensors is a sensitive DoD acquisitions problem, and that building, and testing hull forms and power generation schemes is a nontrivial process, it is useful to concentrate on the software side of things while the physical platform is vetted. By focusing on the software, it allows a designer to design abstractly without being constrained to a preconceived set of platforms and devices. In working with stakeholders a software architect is able to provide the framework for a solution on which to plug the hardware into at a later time.
The software also has important economic characteristics in this context. Software with the required capabilities is likely to be very expensive to develop. However, once the software has been developed and its quality assured, many copies can be deployed at minimal cost. In other words, autonomous capabilities have a high set up cost but a low marginal cost for extra units. Since ASW is likely to need many units, this economy of scale could be important. We suggest that capable software in many inexpensive USVs could be an effective strategy for future ASW.
While developing software for such a complex problem set, it is important and necessary to keep the project modular and compartmentalized. This will enable easier modification as requirements change, and provide for easier code maintenance once the system is fielded.
Requirements changes are common for successful (longlived) software systems, and are especially prominent in military applications: adversary behavior and capabilities rarely stay within the boundaries of what planners expect. Systems for this domain should therefore be designed to be adaptable and rapidly reconfigurable.
To keep things simple, and neat, we propose three distinct subsystems for the USV system: A user interface module, a control module, and a vehicle module.
The user interface module is the human operator's interface with the larger USV constellation. From a single console, such as a rugged laptop, or ship installed console like those found aboard an AEGIS-equipped ship, an operator should be able to control multiple USVs. In order to facilitate this, information needs to be displayed cleanly, with minimal distractions, providing the most important information at a glance.
Consider an aircraft's cockpit as an example, the pilot is able to manage a highly complex machine simply through the strategic placement of certain pieces of data. The most important information for flight is positioned directly in front of the pilot's face or chest, with the next most critical information like navigation and engine status information provided just next to that. This allows a pilot, at a glance, to get a good idea of what is going on in the aircraft.
This principle, applied to the user interface, would prioritize information that an operator needs to interact with over other auxiliary pieces of data. A messy, non-intuitive interface will slow down the absorption of information and limit the number of units that an operator can effectively control.
Although the physical layout of the user interface is important, the conceptual framework and the level of abstraction are even more important for enabling a single operator to control multiple USVs. The key is to enable control of the entire constellation of USVs as a unit, without exposing the operator to the myriad details of the actual controls of the physical vehicle. This requires multiple levels of modeling. In the context of navigation, rather than attempting to pilot a USV by controlling its rudder and engine, higher level models of operator intent are needed.
For example, paths can be determined by a series of waypoints, which can in turn be implied by choices from a standard set of search patterns for each mission type, and by policies for collision avoidance. It would then be up to the software to determine waypoints from the specified patterns and the standard policies, possibly adjusted by parameters such as likelihood of encountering active threats. A lower level of the software would then determine USV heading and speed based on the next waypoint and local conditions, such as proximity to other platforms and navigation obstacles. Related issues are discussed in [4] [5] [6] .
While the UI is important, the vehicle interface could be argued as being more important. The vehicle module will need to be developed simultaneously with the control module, as the two are complementary. The vehicle module is focused primarily on gathering raw data from sensors, pre-conditioning it for further analysis or possibly conducting preliminary analysis aboard the vessel. It is unattractive to relay the raw data to a control ship for several reasons:
1. Bandwidth limitations. At sea communications rely on wireless networking. Bandwidth is already scarce without considering the additional load of full sensor outputs from a swarm of ASW USVs.
2. Human cognitive limitations. The dull part of the mission is sorting through the mountain of empty background data to find any evidence of nearby subs. We need to provide a better than human attention span.
3. Cost. Salaries comprise the lion's share of operating costs. We want to free crew members for other duties except when there is really an adversary sub nearby.
Once the vessel has detected something, it would alert the operator seeking guidance if it was unsure of its analysis. This implies that the vessel has some form of artificial intelligence or machine learning process to be able to learn from humans, what signals are important, and which are likely noise. In addition to mission aspects and in order to promote autonomy, the vessel should be capable of detecting internal malfunctions, taking corrective action for those malfunctions if possible, navigating, and even possibly suggesting courses of action to the operator.
The control module is probably the most important part of the system. It should operate as a conductor does for an orchestra, pulling in all the individual voices to form a harmonious blend of information that can then be consumed by the end user, in this case, the operator.
To accomplish this, an AI agent is probably the best fit, leveraging the raw computational power of a computer, the AI could help conduct the operation of hunting a submarine more elegantly than a person. The control module would necessarily be located either aboard a warship in relative proximity to the sensor vessels, or perhaps remotely at a fixed base. There is a precedent for both options, and it would be a matter of experimentation and learning by doing to determine the right blend. The control module would collect telemetry and mission data from the vehicles and then format the information to display to the operator. Similarly, the module would collect commands and requests for information from the operator and transmit those requests to all or individual vehicles.
By way of illustration, consider the following analogy: The USV system would be a small "cloud". First the clients would be the operator that follow a Software-as-a-Service model. The operator can use whatever physical hardware is provided to link into the USV constellation. Given the mission, certain resources would already be provisioned for that user and are available for them to observe and interact with. Meanwhile, the vessels would operate at the physical layer level, where their controls and interfaces are abstracted away from the operator, but in full view of the virtualization layer that would be inhabited by the control module.
VI. CONCLUSIONS Concepts of operation for the autonomous capabilities to be used are critical for the development of an effective ASW USV. The autonomous capabilities should be chosen to cover the parts of the work that can be more effectively carried out by automated systems rather than by people. These include the dull parts of the mission. ASW is like searching for a needle in a haystack: most of the time there is nothing to see. It is very difficult for a human to remain focused for long periods of time without getting tired and bored, which increases the risk that they might miss an important signal or observation when one does appear. Computers and software do not have that problem.
Identification and modeling of the needed autonomous capabilities will drive the development and testing of the software. As illustrated by recent mishaps involving selfdriving cars, this can be time consuming and difficult. Part of this difficulty is accurately capturing the characteristics of the "wild" real world environment, which is much more complex than the controlled artificial environments typically found in robotics labs.
Safety and effectiveness of the automated capabilities is a key concern. Achieving these goals is technically challenging because the dimensionality of such unconstrained state spaces is tremendously large. The spaces are so large that exhaustive testing is completely out of the question, and even the weakest of conventional software testing coverage criteria may not be feasible to achieve.
For this reason, we recommend a layered approach for reliable operation. Such an approach should include constant monitoring of safety and security criteria during operation as part of the system infrastructure, procedures for recovering from all detectable fault conditions, and fail safe designs that ensure a minimally acceptable outcome even if all resiliency mechanisms fail.
